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Abstract 
Recently some conflicting arguments have been expressed over the extent to which 
image, reputation or similar marketing notions have been employed to explain CSR 
practice. Bebbington, Larrinaga and Moneva [2008, “Corporate Social Reporting and 
Reputation Risk Management, Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal, Vol. 
21, No 3, pp. 337-361] have particularly stressed the need for openness to a 
multitude of theoretical perspectives and argued that reputation risk management 
may provide new insights into CSR practice.  
 
This paper revisits Bebbington et al’s arguments and empirically investigates them 
by examining the reaction of international aviation companies, in terms of Annual 
and stand-alone Reports disclosure, to some major accidents concerning them. Five 
aviation companies have so far been considered whilst the analysis is to be 
complemented by the consideration of five more companies of similar size, country 
and clientele which had no accidents at the time, to increase comparability of the 
findings. A largely qualitative approach to content analysis is employed, considering 
not only the variations in the measured levels of disclosure prior and following the 
accident, but also what is actually stated in the disclosures.  
 
The paper’s findings lend support to the refined Bebbington et al’s arguments, and 
particularly the identified as pragmatic, image-oriented variant of the framework, 
where organisations engage with CSR to ensure they possess adequate supplies of 
the legitimacy resource to maintain profitability and long term survival, although 
some limitations of the approach are also identified. The paper finds particular value 
in considering multiple theoretical frameworks in data analysis and calls for more 
papers of this type. 
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Introduction 
Given that CSR is by and large voluntary, papers looking for motivations for it 
abound, with the most frequent explanation being Legitimacy Theory (LT, see e.g. 
Hogner, 1982; Guthrie and Parker, 1989; Patten, 1992, 2002; Adams and Harte, 1998; 
Brown and Deegan, 1998; Neu et al., 1998; O’Donovan, 1999; Wilmshurst and Frost, 
2000; Woodward et al., 2001; Deegan et al., 2000, 2002; Campbell et al., 2003; 
Crowther, 2004; Tilling, 2004; Deegan, 2007; Islam and Deegan, 2008; O’Sullivan and 
O’Dwyer, 2009). LT is centred on the notion of a social contract, whereby “business 
agrees to perform various socially desired actions in return for approval of its objectives, 
other rewards and ultimate survival” (Guthrie and Parker, 1989, p. 344). Proponents of 
the use of LT in CSR thus argue that a corporation can (and does) legitimise itself in the 
eyes of the public by voluntarily disclosing information about its social and 
environmental activities (O’Donovan, 1999). This employment of CSR, however, 
appears to be strategic: organisations are not primarily interested in their constituents 
right-to-know (and thus in actually being legitimate) but only in being seen as acting 
legitimately (and, ultimately, in ensuring their survival – Deegan et al., 2002).  
This apparent non-accountable, legitimacy-based motivation has recently drawn 
attention to reputation arguments as motivation for CSR. The extent to which Reputation 
Risk Management (RRM) has been employed to explain CSR practice has, however, 
been a matter of debate (see Adams, 2008; Bebbington et al., 2008a,b; Unerman, 2008). 
This is largely due to the fact that, although CSR authors often incorporate relevant 
notions, such as image or reputation, in their arguments or findings (see, e.g. Trotman, 
1979; Deegan and Gordon, 1996; Deegan and Rankin, 1996; Adams et al., 1998; Deegan 
et al., 2000; Woodward et al., 2001; Adams, 2002), they rarely consider an ‘Image’ or 
‘Reputation’ theory as the sole focus of their research, and it seems that such a “motive 
has not yet explicitly been addressed to any great extent in the academic CSR reporting 
literature” (Unerman, 2008, p. 362). Thus, Bebbington et al. (2008a,b), in their attempt to 
theorise the relationship between legitimacy and image, stress the need for openness to a 
multitude of theoretical perspectives and argue that RRM may provide new insights into 
CSR practice and explain better than LT the nature of disclosures; whilst Adams (2008) 
questions the utility of these arguments, particularly as regards understanding the 
complexity of the phenomenon, highlighting the incompleteness of reporting, and 
bringing about change. Both studies, nevertheless, call for more research into the area, 
with Bebbington et al. (2008a) particularly arguing that “it may be instructive to examine 
reporting pre and post a reputation-damaging event” (p. 355). 
In response to their call, this paper presents the, so far, findings of an empirical 
investigation of Bebbington et al’s arguments, within the context of a legitimacy (and/or 
reputation) threat in the form of social accidents. Accidents can be defined as “discrete 
one-time undesirable or unfortunate events that happen unexpectedly in the life of a 
corporation and cause damage to any number or kind of stakeholders” (Zyglidopoulos, 
2001, p. 420). In a world characterised by ‘the instant and photographic reporting of 
calamity’ (p. 421) some accidents can receive such an extensive amount of media 
coverage that they could become landmarks in the history of a particular industry. As 
Lindblom (1993) notes, ‘To the extent corporate performance does not reflect the 
expectations of the relevant publics a legitimacy gap exists’ and ‘the resulting penalty for 
any perceived legitimacy gap will come in the form available and deemed appropriate by 
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the particular person or persons’ (p. 3). Organisations then are expected ‘in the interests 
of ongoing operations [to] undertake corrective action’ (Deegan et al., 2000, p. 105) and 
employ CSR as part of a strategy to defend their legitimacy (Perrow, 1970; Ashforth and 
Gibbs, 1990; Lindblom, 1993; Tilling, 2004). 
Few studies have examined how such external events impact upon the provision of 
CSR disclosures (i.e. Patten, 1992; Walden and Schwartz, 1997, Deegan and Rankin, 
1996; Deegan et al., 2000; Woodward et al., 2008; Cho, 2009), even though these types 
of research may be “very productive in terms of adding insight into the role of 
legitimation strategies” (Lindblom, 1993, p. 20). All these studies have employed LT and 
have not explicitly considered Bebbington et al’s (or similar) image arguments. The 
Patten (1992) and Walden and Schwartz (1997) studies both examined the effects of the 
Exxon Valdez oil spill on environmental disclosure in the ARs of selected American 
industries: the oil industry for Patten (1992); and oil, consumer products, chemical, and 
forest products industries for Walden and Schwartz (1997), and they both found that the 
levels of environmental disclosure increased significantly in the year following the 
accident. On the other hand, Deegan and Rankin (1996), Deegan et al. (2000),  
Woodward et al. (2008) and Cho (2009), have all attempted to examine the reactions of 
specific companies to legitimacy threats to which they were directly exposed: Deegan 
and Ranking (1996) examined the variations on the AR environmental disclosures of 20 
Australian companies that had breached the environmental law; Deegan et al. (2000) 
examined the variations in the AR levels of CSR of five Australian companies in 
response to some major incidents that related to them, such as oil spills and mine and 
plant disasters; Cho (2009) examined variations in the levels of environmental disclosure 
in a single company’s (the French Total) Annual and stand-alone reports, following 
involvement in an oil spill and a subsequent gas explosion, and also conducted 
interviews; and in a study more relevant to the present one, Woodward et al. (2008) 
examined the CSR reaction of companies involved in three major transport accidents in 
the UK: the King Cross Underground fire in 1987; the Paddington Rail disaster of 1999; 
and the Concorde crash outside Paris in 2000.  All these studies findings’ lend support to 
the LT arguments that the corporations sought to address the legitimacy threat by 
increasing their disclosure of environmental and/or CSR information. 
There are, however, a number of limitations to the existing research evidence 
examining legitimacy threats. Studies seem to have focused on examining companies 
operating within a single country (USA, Australia and UK) and mostly the oil industry 
(with the exception of Woodward et al.); on employing only ARs for primary data; and 
on utilising only quantitative forms of CA to analyse their collected data (with the 
exception of Cho); on considering only the positive/negative Corporate Social Disclosure 
(CSD) distinction; and on employing strictly LT to interpret their findings, without 
considering alternative frameworks. Thus, the present study, by investigating companies 
from more than one country and in an alternative to the oil industry; utilising stand-alone 
reports in addition to ARs; conducting longitudinal research, with companies with 
possibly more than one legitimacy threat; considering alternative theoretical frameworks; 
and employing qualitative, in addition to quantitative CA, contributes to this literature. 
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section outlines the Bebbington et al. 
(2998a,b) based theoretical framework which is utilised. This is followed by details on 
the choice of the aviation industry and the individual companies considered. Propositions 
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are then developed, followed by details on the methods employed in their investigation. 
The penultimate section discusses the results whilst the final one concludes the study. 
 
Theoretical framework 
Drawing from the foundational work of Parsons (1960) and Weber (1978), LT has 
been made by researchers, “into an anchor-point of vastly expanded theoretical apparatus 
addressing the normative and cognitive forces that constrain, construct, and empower 
organizational actors” (Suchman, 1995, p. 571). However, despite the theory’s wide 
application, few researchers define the notion when they employ it and “Legitimacy and 
related concepts unfortunately have been… both abstract and indefinite” (Hybels, 1995, 
p. 241). Indeed, LT seems to be “an under-developed theory… [with] many ‘gaps’ in the 
literature which embraces [it]” (Deegan, 2002, p. 298, see e.g. Suchman, 1995; Deegan, 
2002, 2007 for lists of those). And it is these ‘gaps’ in the literature, that make LT “a 
contested terrain” (Bebbington et al., 2008b, p. 372) that seem to have caused the recent 
debate over its relationship with ‘reputation’ explanations for CSR. Prior to presenting in 
more detail this debate, though, there are two main clarifications that need to be made: 
firstly, that legitimacy is perceived here as an operational resource on which 
organisations are dependent for survival and which they extract, often competitively, 
from their cultural environments and employ in pursuit of their goals; this view is most 
notably associated with the work of Pfeffer and his colleagues (Dowling and Pfeffer, 
1975, Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Pfeffer, 1981, see also Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990) and 
is implicitly or explicitly shared from most LT studies in the CSR literature. And 
secondly, that this study, again in line with the relevant literature, focuses on the 
legitimacy of organisations (organisational legitimacy), and particularly business entities, 
as opposed to the legitimacy of the system (Weber, 1966; Habermas, 1973; Gray et al., 
1996), political institutions (as discussed by Lindblom, 1993) or individuals (discerned 
by Luthans, 1985; Woodward et al., 1996). 
Implicitly drawing from the assumption that legitimacy is a vital resource, 
Bebbington et al. (2008a) firstly argue that there is a “hierarchical relationship between 
reputation and legitimacy” and that “social and environmental aspects are not always 
seen to be fundamental to organisations’ legitimacy” (p. 344), in which case, “to be 
economically viable is to be legitimate, at least so far as the owners of the business are 
concerned” (Woodward et al., 1996, p. 332). These ‘pristine capitalist’ (Gray et al., 1996) 
organisations, “are likely to be strongly profit oriented, perhaps to the exclusion of all 
other considerations…would meet the minimum legal and ethical requirements only… 
[would] conform to the letter of the law, but no more” (Henderson, 1984, p. 168), and are 
more likely to be smaller, as opposed to larger, business entities (Revell and Blackburn, 
2007). Bebbington et al. (2008a) then argue that an organisation would employ CSR to 
“merely affect [its] reputation, which then itself has a second order impact on the 
legitimacy of the organisation” (p. 345), essentially arguing that organisations do not 
primarily employ CSR to be legitimate (in ethical terms) but to (strategically) show they 
are acting legitimately.  
Despite their “intuitive appeal” (p. 338), Adams (2008) contests these arguments, 
mainly because within the context of strategic (non-ethical) motivations, image and 
legitimacy would thus become virtually synonymous (indeed, both Bebbington et al. and 
Adams agree on that legitimacy has been often interpreted as reputation in the CSR 
 3
literature). If this is the case, then Adams (2008) wonders ‘So what?’, arguing that the 
links between reputation and CSR have already been studied at length and replacing the 
term ‘legitimacy’ with that of ‘image’ would not add anything to our understanding of the 
complexity of the phenomenon, and neither would highlight the incompleteness of 
reporting. In this sense, an ‘image theory’ would have limited explanatory power, 
similarly to e.g. stakeholder or accountability theories: these notions can be compatible 
with virtually all motivations for CSR since, by its very nature, the latter involves 
communicating an account to selected stakeholders (it is perhaps these considerations 
that provoked Gray et al’s [1995a, p.70] concerns for accountability not being, “an 
especially helpful perspective for the interpretation of CSR practice”). Likewise, in most 
cases organisations would be expected to be strategically, as opposed to ethically, 
motivated and employ CSR to primarily show they are acting legitimately (i.e. built a 
relevant image). Nevertheless, Bebbington et al’s (2008b) argument for the benefits of 
using RRM, as opposed to LT, terminology in most studies seems to be plausible, “given 
this is how many organisations are articulating their motivations for reporting” (p. 373).  
Although Bebbington et al. (2008b) defend the explanatory power of their RRM 
thesis, mainly by pointing out some of the (many) limitations of LT, more interesting that 
considering RRM motivation per se seems to be their argument for the need to retain “a 
plurality of approaches and multiplicity of lens through which to observe, explain and 
predict CSR” (p. 372). In such attempts, they suggest that “the RRM thesis may be part 
of what Parker (2005, p.845) calls and “augmentation theory”, which would allow for a 
more fine grained analysis of disclosures” (p. 371, parentheses in original). For RRM to 
fulfil this objective, though, there is an apparent need for narrower and more refined 
theoretical interpretations, based on the RRM platform, to be developed, “to help 
researchers delve deeper and thereby continue making substantive contributions” 
(Unerman, 2008, p. 363). And although, in that vein, Bebbington et al. (2008a) move on 
to suggest that organisations may produce CSR reports to feel positive about them in a 
narcissistic way (an argument which, in response to Unerman’s criticism, the authors 
[Bebbington et al., 2008b] accept “needs to be explored further” [p. 372]), two other 
image-associated broad strands of arguments can be identified, that would seem to be 
more consistent with the extant literature and serve better the ‘augmentation’ purpose. 
In the first type of approaches, the one that may be referred to as ‘ethics 
pragmatism’, organisations would acknowledge the importance of providing an account 
to their identified powerful stakeholders (Clarkson, 1995; Gray et al., 1996) as a 
condition for maintaining legitimacy for their operations and ‘avoid[ing] potentially 
damaging economic impacts on business’ (O’Dwyer, 1999, p. 328). These organisations 
would be expected to be “very concerned with image building” (Woodward et al., 2001, 
p. 387), but only to the degree of ensuring that they possess adequate supplies of the 
legitimacy resource to maintain profitability and long term survival (Bansal and Roth, 
2000; Bansal, 2005), would be driven by the external pressures of their constituents and 
would seek a passive acquiescence from the latter with regards to their CSR policies. 
Hence, this approach may also largely incorporate the ‘conventional’ LT perceptions as 
well as the Media Agenda Setting Theory (MAST), public pressure, and even some 
institutional arguments1. 
                                                 
1 Public pressure are directly related to these arguments, MAST as a factor shaping stakeholders’ 
expectations (Brown and Deegan, 1998) or even as a stakeholder itself, and institutional arguments, in the 
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Image-oriented organisations, however, having firstly secured sufficient legitimacy 
to maintain operating, by considering that they can strategically impact and/or manipulate 
(Woodward et al., 2001; Deegan, 2002) their legitimacy, may further attempt to extend it 
and improve their market and economic position (Hart, 1995; Bansal and Roth, 2000; 
Dillard et al., 2005; Vogel, 2005; Mirvis and Googins, 2006), by employing CSR to e.g. 
improve reputation, gain additional market share, and/or increase market size and achieve 
higher levels of customer loyalty (Porter and Van Der Linde, 1995; Adams, 2002; Kusku 
and Zarkada-Fraser, 2004; Dillard et al., 2005). These organisations would embrace 
Drucker’s (1984) ‘opportunistic’ views towards Corporate Social Responsibility (CSRes) 
and “would attempt to turn a social problem into economic opportunity” (p. 62); would 
be thus internally driven towards CSRes and CSR; and would attempt to attract the 
attention and seek active support from their constituents, with regards to their legitimacy 
and CSR, to achieve their objectives. Evidently, this approach may also largely 
incorporate decision making theory, positive accounting theory and even Buhr’s (1998) 
political economy of accounting theory arguments2. 
Finally, and although not consistent with Bebbington et al’s arguments, the 
possibility of a moral legitimacy explanation should also be acknowledged as an 
(ultimately third) LT variant, alternate to the above two RRM-based ones (note that the 
very acknowledgement of such a variant would indeed suggest that LT offers a wider 
CSR explanation than RRM, as Adams, 2008, argues). O’Sullivan and O’Dwyer (2009) 
explain that moral legitimacy “rests on judgments not about whether a given activity 
benefits the evaluator, but rather on judgments about whether the activity is “the right 
thing to do” (p. 579). These organisations would thus feel that they should provide their 
constituents with a CSR account, regardless of whether this account is actually expected 
or not and irrespective of the power which every constituent holds in relation to others 
(Unerman and O’Dwyer, 2006). Unerman’s (2007) ‘holistic accountability’, Unerman 
and O’Dwyer’s (2006) identified as first ‘rational accountability’ variant, and Hemphill’s 
(1997) ‘stakeholder capitalism’, all largely offer similar ethic-based motivations. 
 
Propositions 
A number of propositions are drawn from the above theoretical discussion: 
 
1. Following a legitimacy threat, the level of total CSD will show a notable increase 
2. Following a legitimacy threat, the level of Health and Safety (H&S) CSD will show a 
notable increase 
 
These are the central propositions of this study and are expected to hold for all three 
legitimacy based types of organisations engaging with CSR (although, the increased 
                                                                                                                                                 
sense that organisations would perceive CSR as a pragmatic necessity to conform to institutionalised 
pressures and maintain legitimacy. 
2 From a PE perspective, CSR may “serve as a tool for constructing, sustaining, and legitimizing economic 
and political arrangements, institutions, and ideological themes which contribute to the corporation’s 
private interests” (Guthrie and Parker, 1990, p. 166); similarly from a decision making perspective CSD 
would be an opportunistic attempt to enhance profitability by manipulating perceptions; and from a PA 
perspective, CSD may also be seen as an opportunistic attempt of an organisation “to minimize reported 
earnings… [to] reduce the likelihood of adverse political actions and, thereby, reduce its expected costs” 
(Watts and Zimmerman, 1986, p. 115). 
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public pressure may even compel the pristine capitalists to start disclosing some 
voluntary CSD information).  A possible ‘no response strategy’ (O’Donovan, 2002) or 
even a decline in the levels of CSD following the threat would clearly signify that 
organisations do not perceive CSR to be part of the requirements of an implicit social 
contract with their constituents and other theoretical explanations would need to be 
sought. It is expected that this would be particularly the case for the H&S disclosures, 
since in this study some aviation accidents have been selected as threats to the 
organisation’s legitimacy, as discussed next. 
 
3. Following a legitimacy threat, the level of positive CSD will show a notable increase 
4. Following a legitimacy threat, the level of negative CSD will show a notable increase  
 
All organisations employing CSR under each identified LT variant would be 
expected, following the threat to their legitimacy, to increase the levels of positive CSD 
in their reports, with the possible exception of the stakeholder capitalists, who would be 
expected to do so to a lesser extent. These ethics-oriented approaches, though, would be 
also expected to admit guilt and not conceal the negative impacts on their operations, thus 
also increase the levels of negative CSD in their reports, following the threat. Even the 
image-oriented organisations, may increase their negative CSD following the legitimacy 
threat, “in an attempt to diffuse the situation by creating the impression … of honesty” 
(Savage et al., 2000, p. 50). Hence, a need arises for additional characteristics of CSD to 
be considered. 
 
5. Following a legitimacy threat, the level of substantive CSD will show a notable 
increase 
6. Following a legitimacy threat, the level of symbolic CSD will show a notable increase  
 
Organisations with an ethics-oriented approach would be expected to be generally 
willing to bear the higher costs and provide more concrete, substantive information to 
their constituents; whereas, companies adopting an image-centred approach would tend 
to favour symbolic approaches, “since they are more economical and flexible that 
substantive actions” (Savage et al., 2000, p. 48).  One could still argue, though, that 
following a major legitimacy threat, even image-oriented organisations may be expected 
to respond with some substantive CSD in an attempt, for example, to show that they 
conform to the higher performance expectations of their constituents or to alter the 
societal definition of legitimacy.  
As the discussion of the propositions has indicated, focusing on identifying the 
changes in the levels of CSR between prior to, and following, the accident, may be useful 
towards examining whether CSR is part of the requirements of an implicit social contract; 
however, such a focus does not appear to be particularly useful towards identifying which 
specific (out of the three identified) approaches towards CSR the organisations would 
hold. Consequently, the need to consider alternative research approaches that would 
focus less on the quantity, and more on the quality, of the reviewed CSR information, and 
examine over a number of years the disclosure patterns of organisations, is revealed as 
necessary to better understand their motivations for CSR, as discussed in the methods 
section. Firstly however, the aviation case study’s context is discussed. 
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The case of the aviation industry… 
In this study the aviation industry was selected, because of its wide customer base 
and public visibility (Woodward et al., 2008). Internationally, as the evidence from the 
KPMG (2005, 2008) triennial survey has indicated, the industry is among the most 
prolific disclosers of CSD. In addition, aviation accidents generally create a large amount 
of negative news coverage for the object organisations since, all of a sudden, hundreds of 
people are losing their lives: the arguments are more ‘news worthy’, with a greater 
impact on the organisations’ overall reputation (Zyglidopoulos, 2001). While the odds of 
being in a plane crash are nowadays distinctly low compared to other means of 
transportation, the chances of dying in such a disaster are notably higher (Weir, 1999). As 
Hutton (2000), following the Concorde crash, noted: 
 
The interest in the emotional and the intimate has been steadily rising for years, and 
a disaster meets this mood as almost the perfect public event. It legitimises our 
individualistic society’s need to feel, and to do so, however shallowly, together. Of 
course, a plane crash is a more complete disaster than almost any other. Nobody 
settling into the cocoon of a plane journey does so without for an instant thinking 
about a crash. 
 
It seems that W. Buffet’s argument that ‘it takes twenty years to build a reputation 
and five minutes to destroy it’ is particularly applicable in the aviation industry (Rowell, 
2003). Aviation disasters appear to have a considerable negative impact on shareholder 
value and in credit ratings (Knight and Pretty, 1996). Such is the magnitude of these 
accidents that, following the increased public pressure, most airlines retire the number of 
their flight after the crash (Grossman, 2005). A number of major airlines, including Pan 
American - at one time the de facto flag-carrier of the United States – “have failed to 
recover from prolonged periods of crisis which were either precipitated, or worsened, by 
a badly-managed response to an aircraft accident” (Bailey, 2004), whilst some smaller 
aviation companies, may be even forced to go bankrupt or change their brand name (see 
e.g. Helios Airways aviation accident in Greece, 2005). Indeed, both Boeing and Airbus 
(the two major manufacturers of heavy passenger aircraft) have placed huge emphasis on 
the use of aviation safety equipment - now a billion-dollar industry in its own right - and 
made safety a major selling point, realising that a poor safety record in the aviation 
industry is a threat to corporate survival (Weir, 1999). As Deegan et al. (2002) note, 
“when significant events such as major environmental [or, in this case, social] disasters 
occur, or when there is a sustained mass media interest, then it is reasonable to assume 
that most managers would perceive that the organisation’s ongoing legitimacy is 
threatened” (p. 319). It is thus expected that aviation accidents constitute a major 
legitimacy threat to the related companies and a worthwhile area for CSR research, 
particularly given the aforementioned general lack of relevant studies comprehensively 
investigating the area.  
With regard to the decision on the time, the recent history of CSR is usually 
assumed to have started in the early 1970s (Gray et al., 1996); early empirical studies in 
the period 1970-1980 were not specific in focus, and the specialist accounting journals 
which encourage research in this area were set up in the decade beginning in 1980 
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(Matthews, 1997). It is only over the mid-1990s that there has been major growth in 
related research (Deegan, 2002) and, as Gray (2002) further notes, it is from then that the 
“social accounting project is beginning to gain a maturity, depth and direction it has 
lacked for most of its history” (p. 696). Thus, it seems more sensible to examine 
companies’ CSR practices in the last decade. All the collected evidence relates to the 
period 1999-2003. These were quite turbulent times for the whole world and particularly 
the aviation industry, primarily due to the September 11th 2001 terrorist attacks and the 
subsequent US invasion in Iraq. As Scandinavian Airlines (2003AR, p. 25) notes 
regarding the September 11th events: 
 
According to estimates by the UN International Civil Aviation Organisation 
(ICAO), passenger and cargo air traffic declined by 6% in 2001 compared with 
2000. By comparison, the previous forecast was an increase of approx. 5%. 2001 
thus saw the greatest decrease in global airline business since World War II. During 
the Gulf War, air traffic fell by 3%. Several airlines, which even before the attack 
were struggling financially, suffered acute problems resulting in shutdowns and 
bankruptcies. Many carriers have revised their forecasts, laid off thousands of 
employees and grounded a large number of aircraft. 
   
These events may thus be perceived as a ‘macro’-legitimacy threat, since they 
pertain to the legitimacy of the whole industry (and, to some extent, also of the system, 
considering that for the security at the airports primarily responsible are the states and not 
the airlines) and have thus been taken into consideration when interpreting the results.  
 
…and the individual companies and associated threats considered 
In order to decide on the aviation companies to be examined, a number of criteria were 
considered. Given a) the availability of the companies’ reports (checked against the 
records of the British Library, the companies’ own websites, CSEAR’s database and 
CorporateRegister.com), b) the intention to get the widest possible geographic coverage, 
c) the estimated time that each case would take to be analysed and reported, and d) the 
fact that, as Patten (1992) has suggested, larger firms face greater calls to legitimise 
themselves, it was decided to investigate overall five large companies and in each case to 
check the Annual and stand-alone reports two years prior and after and for the year of the 
accident, to better capture the accident effect on the level of CSD. It should be noted that 
the analysis is to be complemented by the consideration of five more companies of 
similar size, country and clientele which had no accidents at the time to increase 
comparability of the findings. Deegan et al. (2000) acknowledge that the selection of four 
(as in their case) or five (as in this study) reports around the incident is somewhat 
arbitrary. However, it is expected that “this should be sufficient to establish any 
variations in the extent of disclosure before and after an incident” and that this ‘narrow 
window’ will help “to reduce the possibility of other extraneous events influencing the 
disclosures” (Deegan et al., 2000, p.117). Consequently, the sample of the study includes 
the following organisations: 
 
¾ British Airways - BA (examining the impact of the Concorde accident of their co-
operator, Air France, 2000) 
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¾ Air France – AF (Concorde accident, 2000, flight 4590, 114 fatalities) 
¾ American Airlines - AA (2001, September 11th attacks and Flight 587, November 
12th, 265 fatalities) 
¾ Singapore Airlines - SIA (2000, Flight 006, 83 fatalities), and, 
¾ Scandinavian Airlines - SAS (2001, Flight 686, 114 fatalities) 
 
These were among the world’s largest airlines at the time, although it should be 
stressed that major role in their selection played their data availability. All companies 
seem to have suffered considerable decreases in their revenues and share prices following 
the associated accidents. Concorde was the ‘flagship’ plane for both AF and BA, an 
“emblem like no other of the power of technology” (Bunting, 2000). Its accident attracted 
a lot of negative publicity, making it the most famous air-crash in the aviation industry 
(other than the September 11th attacks – Gero, 2006) and the post-accident sharp decline 
in ticket sales led to the two companies’ decision to withdraw it from service (Rowell, 
2003). The number of incidents3 that AA were involved in 2001, shortly led them to start 
considering the possibility of declaring bankruptcy: its share price at the end of the year 
had fallen by over 55%, it’s passenger revenues by 14% and the company reported USD 
1.8 billion losses for 2001, as opposed to the USD 813 million generated profits in 2000 
(AA, 2001AR). AA’s reported decline in profit and revenue following September 11th 
was considerably higher than the ones of the rest of the (competing to AA) airlines 
examined in this study (with AF in fact increasing its revenues in the first post September 
11th year). And although a year after the terrorist attacks, passengers numbers in Europe 
were, by and large, recovered, for AA (and, indeed, most of US carriers) this was not the 
case, due to the increased concerns over security and the additional inconvenience 
associated with the increased security checks, which considerably lengthened the journey 
times (Gahan, 2002). Nevertheless, SIA’s accident also generated a lot of negative 
publicity over the company’s ‘catalogue of failings’ (Perrin, 2000), mainly concerning 
the pilot’s inexplicable decision to use the wrong runaway and the Company’s decision to 
proceed with taking off despite the severe weather conditions (Gero, 2006). These 
failings led dozens of survivors and relatives of those killed to file lawsuits against the 
airline (SIA, 2001AR) and the accident appeared to have an impact also on SIA’s share 
price, which in the next six months had lost almost 30% of its market value. Finally, 
although in SAS’ accident, the airline was exonerated of any responsibility, this was 
Italy’s worst aviation disaster and the company’s first fatal accident and also attracted a 
lot of publicity. This was also reflected in the approximately 10% decrease of the 
Company’s share price (on top of the approximately 35% decrease following the 
September 11th attacks) in the first week after the accident, at a time where the industry’s 
average share performance had started recovering following the terrorist attacks’ initial 
shock (SAS, 2001AR). It was considered, therefore, that the considered accidents posed 
substantial legitimacy threats for the associated companies. 
The timing of the accident in relation to the release of the considered reports, as in 
Deegan et al.’s (2000), was also considered in this study. Thus, since “there is generally 
                                                 
3 It should be noted that the term ‘incidents’ (as opposed to the term ‘accidents’, that is used in the 
discussion of all the other companies) is preferred when discussing AA, considering that these also include 
the September 11th terrorist attacks. Nevertheless, the term ‘accidents’ is used when collective references to 
the investigated legitimacy threats are made, to avoid long and complicated arguments.   
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between two and three months between balance date and the date the reports are 
finalised” (Brown and Deegan, 1998, p. 28), the potential for an accident to occur 
between the company’s end of financial year (e.g. 31st of March for BA) and the release 
of the ARs (e.g. around June for BA) was considered. Further, it was also taken into 
consideration the fact that, while the appropriate authority investigations for the causes of 
the accident take place, organisations are not permitted to disclose any information with 
regard to the accident. Most accidents (with the exception of Air France) were found to 
have occurred after the companies’ release of the ARs, in the next fiscal year, and well 
before the new balance date: for those, it is expected that the timing of the accidents has 
not impaired the undertaking of the research in this way. For Air France, the fact that the 
ARs was released at a time very near to the accident has been taken into consideration 
when interpreting the findings. 
 
Methods  
The methods adopted in this study involve a longitudinal case study research design 
with Content Analysis (CA) as data collection and analysis method. Case studies are 
frequently employed in the CSR literature (see e.g. Hogner, 1982; Guthrie and Parker, 
1989; Campbell, 2000; Cormier and Gordon, 2001; Larrinaga et al., 2001; Deegan et al., 
2000; 2002; Rahaman et al., 2004; Buhr and Reiter, 2006; Dey, 2007; O’Dwyer and 
Unerman, 2008; Woodward et al., 2008; Cho, 2009). This approach allows the researcher 
‘to deal with the subtleties and intricacies of complex social situations’ (Denscombe, 
2003, p. 38), to further ‘explain the causal links in real-life interventions that are too 
complex for the survey or experimental strategies’ (Yin, 1994, p. 15) and can therefore, 
ease both theory-building and theory-testing (Denscombe, 2003). A longitudinal case 
study approach seems to be particularly suitable for this study, since in order to 
investigate the above set propositions, a detailed and longitudinal analysis of the 
investigated organisations CSR disclosing patterns, involving varied approaches to data 
analysis, needs to be conducted (see also e.g. Hogner, 1982; Guthrie and Parker, 1989; 
Campbell, 2000; Campbell et al., 2003 for other CSR longitudinal approaches). In 
contrary to the Woodward et al’s (2008) employed two sample years and to Deegan et 
al’s (2000) employed four, the CSR of the reviewed companies is examined over five 
years around the accident (two prior to, on the year of, and two following the accident), 
in an attempt to more comprehensively review any disclosure variations before and after 
the accidents.   
For data collection and analysis, a largely qualitative form of Content Analysis 
(CA) was employed. This firstly involves utilising any stand-alone reports available (in 
this case ‘environmental’, ‘sustainability’ and ‘supplementary data’ reports), in addition 
to the Annual Reports, as sampling units (data) for the analysis. With regards to the CA 
context, as the discussion on the study’s propositions has indicated, three disclosure 
classifications were adopted. These included the theme of disclosure; the substantive vs. 
symbolic disclsoure; and the positive vs. negative disclosure. As recording/measurement 
unit, a page size approach largely based on the work of Hackston and Milne (1996) was 
employed, where ‘the written and pictorial part of a page… [is] considered to be the page 
itself” (Gray et al., 1995b, fn16, p. 90). This generally involved firstly counting 
sentences; then deriving a page measure pertaining to narrative information, by adjusting 
the sentences to an average sentences per page ration; and finally adding to the latter the 
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derived measure of the non-narrative (pictorial) information, including tables, graphs and 
images, measured by using a page-adjusted grid, to get an estimate of the total disclosure 
in pages. This resulted in finally CSR to be measured in sentences, pages and (when 
adjusting for the total pages for each report for Annual Reports only) proportions of 
report, in an attempt to better capture the variations in CSD. Nevertheless, since the 
results across measurement units are largely consistent, the page measure is mostly 
employed in the discussion of the findings (see Appendix A for details on the CA 
sampling and recording units). 
In addition to the more quantitative CA approach described above, focusing on the 
manifest content of information and employing customised pre-determined categories, 
some qualitative analysis of the collected data is also employed, in an attempt to generate 
some inductive categories and investigate the latent content of the analysed information. 
This largely follows the Bebbington and Gray’s (2000) approach, as refined by Buhr and 
Reiter (2006), which implicitly draws on Yin’s (2009) ‘pattern matching’ and 
‘explanation building’ techniques: it generally involves ‘scanning’ the text for 
information that could be relevant, supporting or not, to each of the identified LT 
organisational variants  and also identifying data that could not be explained by any 
variant, to use as input for further refinements on the framework, in an attempt to explain 
all the data. Following Buhr and Reiter (2006), some frames were also used, to 
summarise the evidence and provide some indication of the frequency of each incurred 
theme.  The findings from both the quantitative and qualitative CA are presented next. 
 
Findings and discussion 
Findings on the propositions 
Table 1 provides a summary of the findings for all the cases in respect of the year-
to-year changes in total CSD. The findings support proposition 1 since total CSD showed 
a notable increase in Y1 for all examined cases, ranging from 8% for BA (which was not 
directly involved in an accident in the period) to 320% for AA (which was directly 
involved in a number of incidents in the period). Additionally it can be seen that: 
 
¾ Y1 represented a peak in disclosure over the five year period for three cases (BA, 
AA and SAS) – for AF the disclosure reached a peak in Y2 and for SIA in Y3 
¾ For most cases (with the exception of SIA) disclosure declined in the last two 
years and in Y3 it either returned to the Y-2 levels (AA), remained at considerably 
higher than Y-2 levels (AF) or was almost halved (BA and SAS). 
 
There are a number of explanations for why AF and SIA reached a peak in 
disclosure in Y2 and Y3, respectively. The Y2 peak in AF’s disclosure could be perceived 
as a delayed response to the legitimacy threat posed by the accident, due to the proximity 
of the latter to the publication of the Y1 accounts. This Y2 increase could have also partly 
been a response to the industry threat posed by the September 11th attacks. SIA’s increase 
in the disclosure (albeit at a lower rate than in Y1) in the last two years, could be due to 
the accident triggering an incremental increase in the amount of CSD (as in Cho, 2009) 
and/or it could be a response to the September 11th industry threat (which also happened 
in Y2). In two other cases, the accident happened in the same year as September 11th 
(SAS and AA, with the latter being directly involved) and was followed by increased 
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disclosure. But, although in BA’s case the terrorist attacks happened in Y2, the 
company’s disclosure showed a considerable decrease. The evidence is therefore 
inconclusive on whether this industry threat had an effect on the organisations’ CSR and 
if so, the extent of the latter, although there would appear to be some evidence of impact.  
 
Table 1 Total CSD in pages and % of year-to-year change  
Pre-accident Post-accident  
Y-2 Y-1 Y1 Y2 Y3
61.95 66.59 47.03 27.91 BA 60.59 2% 8% (29%) (41%) 
10.55 14.66 35.99 21.67 AF 8.44 25% 39% 145% (40%) 
7.75 32.56 13.09 13.70 AA 12.11 (36%) 320% (60%) 5% 
6.21 12.13 13.67 13.88 SIA 4.91 26% 95% 13% 2% 
64.76 98.26 23.28 28.60 SAS 52.49 23% 52% (76%) 23% 
Average % of change 8% 103% (1%) (10%) 
 
The findings are in agreement with the literature investigating reactions of specific 
companies to legitimacy threats (i.e. Deegan and Rankin, 1996; Deegan et al., 2000; 
Woodward et al., 2008; Cho, 2009), which all report an increase in the environmental or 
CSD information in Y1. The 100% plus average increase is, however, considerably higher 
than the literature (reviewed in section 4.4.5) suggests. Most studies report increases of 
less than 50% on average (the only exception being Cho’s [2009] 400%, which however 
concerned a single company). This may be attributed to the aviation industry’s wide 
public visibility, with air crashes having great impacts on organisational reputations and 
posing immense legitimacy threats. The possibility that the findings were augmented by 
the September 11th attacks should also be acknowledged.   
Table 2 presents the findings in terms of year-to-year change in disclosure for the 
three reporting media: AR, social and environmental reports and supplementary data. 
Following the accident, the disclosure increased for almost all reviewed documents, with 
a notable exception being the SAS decision to discontinue the publication of 
supplementary data and incorporate the relevant information in their environmental 
report. Interestingly, in Y2 and Y3 all information provided in stand-alone reports 
(social/environmental and supplementary data) decreased whilst the majority of 
information in AR increased. This also applied to the companies that were publishing 
stand-alone information in the pre-accident period (BA, SAS), where the increase in AR 
was greater than that in stand-alone reporting. This general shift to AR disclosure could 
be attributed to an isomorphic industry trend (although the evidence from a number of 
surveys, such as KPMG, 2003, 2005, 2008, supports that stand-alone reporting in the last 
decade has kept rising). It might also be due to organisational attempts, “to reduce the 
costs of external reporting” (SAS, 2002AR, p.106) of their CSRes performance (as 
discussed earlier in section 7.6.3), by disclosing additional information on the AR and on 
the Internet (the latter CSR medium was not considered in this study). The argument that 
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organisations increased the disclosed information in Y1 to address the threat seems, 
however, more convincing. In these difficult times, the organisations seemed to focus on 
moving information firstly to the main ‘appendix’ of the AR (the main stand-alone report, 
as SAS have done), and then to the AR, their main communication source, to better 
address their most important stakeholders concerns. Nevertheless, in Y3 the disclosure in 
the AR either decreased or stabilised (with the exception of SAS, which nevertheless 
showed a decline in disclosure in Y2), further indicating that the increase in disclosure in 
Y1 was to address the threat. 
 
Table 2 Source of CSD and year-to-year change  
Pre-accident Post-accident  
Y-2→Y-1 Y-1→Y1 Y1→Y2 Y2→Y3
BA (51%) 28% 3% - 
AF 25% 39% 145% (40%) 
AA (36%) 12% 51% 5% 
SIA 26% 95% 13% 2% 
SAS (5%) 118% (8%) 23% 
AR 
Average (18%) 57% 35% - 
BA 12% (2%) (46%) (27%) 
AA - ∞ (100%) - 
SAS 2% 78% (100%) - 
Social/ 
Environmental 
Average 7% 38% (82%) (27%) 
BA - 25% (7%) (61%) 
SAS ∞ (100%) - - Supplementary Data Average - (38%) (7%) (61%) 
Average % of change 8% 103% (1%) (10%) 
 
Factors such as size and particularly country of origin may also assist in explaining 
the absolute levels of CSD, as studies by e.g. Gray et al. (1995a) and Adams et al. (1998) 
show. In this case, the CSD levels were heavily influenced by whether the companies 
published stand-alone information or not, as Table 2 in conjunction with Table 8.1 show. 
Although all organisations are of a considerable size, the larger ones engaged with 
publishing stand-alone CSR information on an annual basis (e.g. BA and AF – despite 
that for the latter these were not available) and, on the whole, disclosed more than the 
smaller companies, for which stand-alone reporting was either sporadic (SAS) or non 
existent (SIA). This does not explain however why AA, the largest of the five 
organisations at the time, only published one stand-alone report over the period. Thus the 
country of origin seems a more suitable interpretive factor in this case: companies from 
countries with a longer tradition of stand-alone reporting such as the UK, France and 
(some) Scandinavian countries, disclosed more than companies from Asia (other than 
Japan) and the US (KPMG, 2003, 2005, 2008 – although it should be noted that US 
companies have shown a considerable increase in publishing stand-alone information in 
recent years, as KPMG, 2008 reveals).  
Table 3 synthesises the findings in terms of absolute year-to-year change per 
disclosure theme. The findings lend support to proposition 2 since H&S CSD increased 
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considerably in Y1 for all examined cases, ranging from 74% for BA to 557% for AA. 
Nevertheless, all disclosure themes showed a considerable increase on average in their 
absolute levels of disclosure in Y1, in what may be perceived as organisational attempts 
to address all stakeholders’ information needs following the legitimacy threats.  In 
addition: 
 
¾ H&S showed the greatest increase across all themes in Y1 for most organisations 
(with the exception of AA), followed by the environment 
¾ Organisational stances vary in Y2 and Y3. Most of the themes decreased, with 
H&S showing the greatest decrease and environment the least. 
 
The fact that H&S disclosure remained at higher levels than in Y-2 throughout the 
post-accident period, could be because the accident (and potentially also the September 
11th events) triggered an incremental increase in the amount of relevant disclosure. 
Notably, the increase at Y1 for H&S CSD was considerably greater than for the total CSD 
in all cases. The findings are consistent with Deegan et al. (2000) and Woodward et al. 
(2008), who also report greater H&S than total CSD increases, indicating that the 
organisations were particularly interested in restoring their legitimacy in respect of this 
‘threatened’ area. The average 271% increase for H&S disclosure was, nevertheless, 
considerably higher than Deegan et al. (2000) and Woodward et al. (2008), as was also 
the case for proposition 1. The considerable increase in environmental disclosure, though 
throughout the post- accident period (a theme not directly related to the accidents) lends 
support to the Gray et al. (1996) argument that environmental CSD is often employed to 
distract attention from the issue(s) of concern (as particularly AA’s stance suggests). This 
was particularly evident in SAS’s case, where following the accident it even expanded its 
AR title to include the sub-title: “& Summary of Environmental Report”. The 
environmental consequences of aviation nevertheless are an issue of general concern, and 
the organisational efforts to proportionately increase their environmental CSD in the 
post-accident period, may also be perceived as an attempt to pre-empt stakeholder 
attention to their environmental impacts. The relatively smaller increase in Y1 for 
workplace and marketplace could be because these categories have generally higher 
absolute levels of disclosure, particularly in the pre-accident period. The findings are 
consistent with Deegan et al. (2000), who also report variations per disclosure theme. 
Interestingly, their theme with the greatest increase was also H&S (108%), followed by 
the environment (77%), community (46%) and workplace (9%), although their examined 
accidents mainly involved oil spills. It should be noted that, unlike this study, disclosure 
kept rising throughout their examined period for most of the themes. 
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Table 3 Theme of CSD and year-to-year change  
Pre-accident Post-accident  
Y-2→Y-1 Y-1→Y1 Y1→Y2 Y2→Y3
BA (20%) 74% (26%) (34%) 
AF (73%) 400% 268% (47%) 
AA (21%) 557% (75%) (27%) 
SIA 100% 231% (28%) (26%) 
SAS 123% 91% (79%) 21% 
H&S  
Average 22% 271% 12% (23%) 
BA 40% (2%) (22%) (83%) 
AF 343% 64% (4%) (62%) 
AA (40%) (76%) (34%) 52% 
SIA 18% 206% 42% 22% 
SAS (31%) 36% (53%) 94% 
Marketplace 
Average 66% 46% (14%) 5% 
BA 38% 6% (34%) (7%) 
AF 5% 3% 121% (28%) 
AA (37%) 163% (14%) 1% 
SIA 29% (13%) 125% 14% 
SAS 3% 36% (22%) 30% 
Workplace 
Average 8% 39% 35% 2% 
BA 235% 2% (38%) (23%) 
AF - ∞ 764% 24% 
AA - ∞ (100%) - 
SIA 33% 190% (79%) (20%) 
SAS 220% 175% (48%) 170% 
Community 
Average 98% 122% 100% 30% 
BA (34%) 11% (19%) 57% 
AF (100%) ∞ 2,548% (39%) 
AA (33%) 1,842% (89%) 64% 
SIA (71%) 188% 43% 70% 
SAS 20% 46% (83%) (16%) 
Environment 
Average (44%) 522% 480% 27% 
BA 91% (34%) (61%) 50% 
AF - - ∞ (77%) 
AA ∞ 2,138% (100%) - 
SIA 10% 178% (7%) (30%) 
SAS 119% 83% (72%) 178% 
Other 
Average 55% 473% (60%) 24% 
Average % of change 8% 103% (1%) (10%) 
 
Table 4 presents the findings in terms of positive vs. negative total CSD. The findings 
support propositions 3 and 4, since, following the threat, the levels of both positive and 
negative total CSD showed notable increases.  In addition: 
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¾ almost all companies in Y1 increased their negative rather than positive disclosure 
to a greater extent (with the exception of AF)  
¾ this trend was also largely evident in Y2. Companies (with the exception of SAS) 
either increased their negative rather than positive disclosure to a greater extent 
(AF, AA, SIA) or decreased  their negative rather than the positive disclosure to a 
lower extent (BA)  
 
Table 4 Positive vs. negative total CSD and year to year change  
Pre-accident Post-accident  
Y-2→Y-1 Y-1→Y1 Y1→Y2 Y2→Y3
BA (9%) 14% (33%) (32%) 
AF 24% 85% 134% (39%) 
AA (48%) 636% (94%) 16% 
SIA 19% 101% (28%) 19% 
SAS - 47% (73%) 29% 
Positive  
Average (3%) 177% (19%) (1%) 
BA (7%) 37% (23%) (51%) 
AF 11% 24% 242% (56%) 
AA (75%) 1,088% 1% (18%) 
SIA 32% 114% 473% (70%) 
SAS 22% 47% (85%) 54% 
Negative 
Average (3%) 262% 122% (28%) 
BA 77% (46%) (24%) (20%) 
AF 31% (78%) 256% (23%) 
AA (13%) 44% 41% 11% 
SIA 450% 14% 176% 136% 
SAS 190% 69% 76% (10%) 
Neutral 
Average 147% 1% 105% (22%) 
Average % of change 8% 103% (1%) (10%) 
 
The findings are in contrast to most of the literature predicting (Whetten, 1980; 
Milne and Gray, 2007), and finding (Abrahamson and Park, 1994; Deegan and Gordon, 
1996; Deegan and Rankin, 1996) that organisations suppress negative news, but are 
consistent with the findings of Woodward et al. (2008). Although the evidence could be 
interpreted as an attempt to improve image by, for example, offering apologies and 
admitting guilt to create the impression of honesty (as is  more likely the case in 
Woodward et al., given the low absolute levels of negative CSD they established), it is 
unlikely that organisations would do so to this extent. It rather seems that organisational 
attempts to decrease costs in the first two post-accident (and September 11th) years were 
not restricted to reducing external reporting, but also resulted in neglecting their CSRes 
impacts, as reflected in the increasingly negative disclosure. As BA acknowledge for that 
period: 
one key challenge has been ensuring that we do not lose sight of important long-
term priorities because of difficult market conditions. This includes maintaining the 
focus on our wider social and environmental responsibilities (BA, 2003SER, p.1). 
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 As Table 5 demonstrates, the findings also support propositions 5 and 6, since in Y1 
the levels of both substantive and symbolic total CSD showed notable increases in all 
cases (with the sole exception of BA’s 8% decrease in symbolic CSD). Additionally,  
 
¾ Most companies increased their substantive CSD in a greater extent that their 
symbolic in Y1, with the exceptions being AF (who delayed their substantive 
response until the next year) and AA (that published an ad hoc 
social/environmental report at the time – a document largely symbolic as the 
findings in section 6.5.3 suggest) 
¾ This trend was also largely evident in Y2, with companies either increasing to a 
greater extent, or decreasing to a lower extent their, substantive rather than the 
symbolic disclosure, with the marginal exception of SIA and SAS.  
 
Table 5 Substantive vs. symbolic total CSD and year to year change  
Pre-accident Post-accident  
Y-2→Y-1 Y-1→Y1 Y1→Y2 Y2→Y3
BA (14%) 25% (22%) (47%) 
AF (22%) 23% 251% (35%) 
AA (41%) 282% (50%) 8% 
SIA 51% 92% 14% 12% 
SAS 4% 60% (79%) 36% 
Substantive 
Average (4%) 96% 23% (5%) 
BA 39% (8%) (41%) (24%) 
AF 162% 66% 78% (47%) 
AA (24%) 399% (88%) (14%) 
SIA (22%) 49% 15% (18%) 
SAS 19% 29% (74%) 47% 
Symbolic 
Average 35% 107% (22%) (11%) 
BA 30% (46%) (37%) 65% 
AF 4% (70%) 310% (16%) 
AA ∞ 513% 204% 3% 
SIA (100%) ∞ (15%) (100%) 
SAS 213% 80% (75%) (46%) 
Other 
Average 37% 119% 77% (46%) 
Average % of change 8% 103% (1%) (10%) 
 
The generally higher increases in substantive, rather than the symbolic CSD, in 
both Y1 and Y2 could be explained as organisational attempts to substantively address the 
threats. This could be attributed to the considerable magnitude of the threats 
(compounded by the events of September 11th), which as discussed earlier, were also 
possibly behind the generally higher increase than that established in earlier studies.  
Nevertheless, it appears that only in SIA’s case was there some evidence (the continuous 
increase in the substantive disclosure throughout the post-accident period) that the 
accident could have caused an incremental change and a shift towards more substantive 
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attention to their social and environmental impacts. An additional supporting sign was 
that in Y3 SIA also started publishing stand-alone information (not considered here due to 
its unavailability). The findings for total CSD in respect of this distinction are, however, 
not entirely consistent with the ones for H&S CSD, as Table 6 reveals. It appears that: 
 
¾ Both substantive and symbolic H&S CSD increased considerably across all cases 
in Y1 
¾ The relevant increases in H&S CSD were higher than the ones in total CSD at the 
time (the only exception being SAS’s substantive CSD ) 
¾ In Y1 most organisations increased their symbolic than the substantive H&S CSD 
to a considerably higher extent (with the exception of the more balanced BA)  
¾ In Y2 organisations either decreased their substantive than the symbolic disclosure 
to a lower extent (BA, AA, SIA, SAS) or increased their substantive than the 
symbolic disclosure to a greater extent (AF).  
 
Table 6 Substantive vs. symbolic H&S CSD and year-to-year-change  
Pre-accident Post-accident  
Y-2→Y-1 Y-1→Y1 Y1→Y2 Y2→Y3
BA (31%) 76% (13%) (53%) 
AF (64%) 222% 313% (36%) 
AA 3% 391% (71%) (29%) 
SIA 117% 187% (11%) (14%) 
SAS 112% 42% (74%) 48% 
Substantive  
Average 27% 184% 29% (17%) 
BA 26% 68% (55%) 42% 
AF (87%) 1,360% 208% (65%) 
AA (100%) ∞  (84%) (17%) 
SIA 50% 425% (68%) (100%) 
SAS 76% 171% (78%) 10% 
Symbolic 
Average (7%) 506% (15%) (26%) 
BA (21%) 78% (73%) 105% 
AF (100%) - ∞ (25%) 
AA - - - - 
SIA - - - - 
SAS 988% 130% (83%) (49%) 
Other 
Average 173% 42% (39%) 6% 
Average % of change 22% 271% 12% (23%) 
 
The higher increases in H&S compared to total disclosure in Y1, across all cases, 
could be interpreted as organisational attempts to address the legitimacy threats 
pertaining to this area. However, the preference for symbolic H&S CSD in Y1 contradicts 
the latter findings and, further, is not consistent with the general preference for 
substantive total CSD at the time. The preference for symbolic H&S CSD in Y1 is, 
nevertheless, consistent with Gray et al’s (1995a) finding that, “health and safety 
disclosure appears to be a strong illustration of Lindblom’s second legitimation strategy – 
‘changing perceptions’” (p.66): organisations, following the threat, and not being able to 
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address their relevant impacts substantively, employ H&S CSD in a way that, “add[s] to 
the image of a competent and concerned organization which took its responsibilities in 
this field seriously” (loc. cit.). Organisations did so by, for example, expanding their 
relevant awards sections (SIA), using two page images in the AR of personnel conducting 
security checks (SAS), expressing their commitment to safety in large typeface (BA), or 
changing the wording in their AR headings to emphasise their commitment to safety 
(AF), as the next table reveals. These are all signs of an image (as opposed to ethics) 
oriented organisational stance towards CSR and CSRes, as also argued next. 
 
Table 7 AF changing the emphasis 
Y-1  Y1
Since it was founded, Air France has 
chosen to carry out its own aircraft 
maintenance, which gives it full 
control over safety, punctuality and 
costs. Two large divisions supply 
these services: the Maintenance 
Division and the Industrial 
Engineering Division (AF, 2000AR, 
p.26) 
 Safety is a priority at Air France. Ever since 
it was founded, the Company has insisted on 
maintaining its own aircraft. And besides 
maintenance, this strategic choice has 
provided enhanced management of its 
aircraft and control over its operating costs. 
It also means it can add value to this activity 
(AF, 2001AR, p.36). 
Air France aims to implement a 
profitable strategy of growth. It 
intends to finance its development 
through cash flow from operations, 
restored profitability and a tight rein 
on costs (p.34) 
 As it strives to offer the best possible 
service, an airline has to ensure its own 
profitability, thereby also guaranteeing 
passenger safety and comfort (p.46). 
A flight that arrives on time, discreet, 
attentive personnel, services that 
measure up to expectations, a quality 
welcome: in short everything a 
passenger might expect from a world-
class airline. This is what Air France 
has to deliver to win its customers 
(p.32). 
 By safely flying its customers in the 
simplest, fastest, more comfortable way 
possible, regardless of their destination, Air 
France hopes to ensure that it becomes – and 
stays – its customers preferred airline (p.15). 
 
Findings from the qualitative analysis 
In this section the qualitative analysis evidence is reported in respect of the three 
main LT variants identified earlier. To further look into the potential influences of the 
relevant accident, a distinction regarding evidence ‘before’ and ‘after’ the threat is also 
made. Table 8 summarises the evidence from the ‘pattern-matching’ activity for 
stakeholder capitalism. The organisational references are diverse in respect to both the 
content, and how they are affected by the accident. Most organisations (with the 
exception of SIA) declare their commitment to sustainability. However, these definitions 
vary considerably across companies (e.g. for AF, sustainability, at least allegedly, 
primarily involves compliance with ethical principles whilst for SAS, this also pertains to 
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sustaining shareholder value); within the same company across years (e.g. AA in 2001 
appeared to consider sustainability as regards future generations, whilst in 2003 as 
regards their profitability); and, to some extent, even across pages of the same report (e.g. 
in BA, 2002SER, on p. 10 the importance of sustainability for future generations is 
emphasised, whilst on p. 12, it is stressed that the economic ‘dimension’ should also be 
taken into consideration).  
 
Table 8 Summary of the ‘pattern-matching’ activity for stakeholder capitalism 
Company Before the accident After the accident 
BA 
 
References to commitment to sustainability 
as leaving natural and social environment in 
better condition; detailed references to 
commitment to citizenship and open 
dialogue with stakeholders; references to 
integration of social and environmental 
factors into management systems. 
 
 
Continuing references to sustainability, 
acknowledgement of contribution of 
aviation to greenhouse effect; references to 
ethical responsibilities of business towards 
employees; reference to commitment to 
improving social and environmental 
performance. 
AF  [No reference] 
 
Acknowledgment of responsibility ‘to 
different environments’ and to several 
stakeholders; initiation of additional safety 
measures; reference to integration of 
environmental policy into the production 
process; few mentions of commitment to 
sustainable development, ethics and 
transparency and to cleaner technology, 
even if more costly and despite the difficult 
times for aviation. 
 
AA 
 
References to considering the interests of 
employees in every decision made. 
 
References to commitment to sustainability; 
references to conservation and description 
of business ethics policy; some evidence of 
integration of environmental policies in 
practice through, e.g. training. 
 
SIA 
 
References to commitment to community 
and local arts. 
 
Frequent references to corporate citizenship 
and giving back to communities.  
 
SAS 
 
References to integration of environmental 
work to all decisions and to considering all 
environmental aspects of operations; few 
mentions of commitment to sustainability. 
 
Continuing reference to integration of 
environmental work to all decisions and to 
considering all environmental aspects of 
operations; few references to endorsing 
sustainability. 
 
 
These diverse definitions indicate that organisations tend to interpret sustainability 
to their own benefit, and as ultimately entailing sustainable profits and image. In that, 
they seem to have been advised by the organisation offering assurance to their stand-
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alone reports. SAS report that their auditors suggested it increases its efforts to highlight 
the link between the Group’s environmental work and its financial performance (2001ER, 
p.61); and BA seemed to have also been advised by its auditors to do so, as the following 
extract from its 2000 Social and Environmental Report’s Assurance statement reveals 
(the assurance organisation is SustainAbility and it is signed by John Elkington): 
 
In assessing corporate positioning in relation to the triple bottom line of sustainable 
development, we use the simple metaphor of a 5-speed gearbox… As for the fifth 
gear, the challenge is to link improvements in TBL performance both with 
customer appeal and the value of a company’s brand… Tomorrow’s economy will 
be about increasing returns, where we learn to exploit virtuous cycles rather than 
manage vicious ones (BA, 2000SER, p. 11). 
 
Owen (2007) also notes this, “more strategic, ‘value added’ approach to assurance 
… which focuses centrally on the usefulness of the report for stakeholders, and is 
explicitly concerned with driving future performance” (p. 172). Although this is still far 
from a reporting approach based on the interpretation of sustainability as in Brundtland 
Report (UNWCED, 1987 - a reporting approach which however, Milne and Gray argue 
that is “extremely difficult and no (corporate) organization would want to do” [2007, p. 
195]), it appears that it can serve as a mean of persuading companies to engage with 
stakeholders. However, “this still begs the question as to how stakeholders can use the 
assurance findings in any way that might influence organizational decision-making” 
(Owen, 2007, p. 179). 
As Table 8 indicates, the accident had an effect on the amount and nature of the 
supporting references to ethical motivations for CSR for most organisations (with the 
exception of SAS). The organisations responded in different ways. AF and AA started 
making references to their commitment to sustainability, ethics and transparency, as 
discussed above, and substantially increased their relevant arguments (particularly, AF 
had no such references in the pre accident period). BA, despite questioning the 
contribution of aviation to climate change throughout the pre-accident period, following 
the accident they started acknowledging it; whereas SIA, started making frequent 
references to corporate citizenship. It appears, therefore, that even by solely considering 
the (initially) identified arguments that could be supportive of an ethically motivated 
organisational stance towards CSRes and CSR, it still seems that organisations are not 
ethically motivated. Indeed, as the next table indicates, most organisations offer 
pragmatic arguments as motivations.    
It appears that the organisational references are, again, diverse in respect to both the 
content and as to how the businesses are affected by the accident. It however seems that 
they considerably exceed in extent and breadth the supporting evidence for stakeholder 
capitalism in Table 8. It could be argued that, as the table indicates, most often the 
‘pragmatic’ arguments pertain to the importance of stakeholders to the organisations’ 
viability. At times, organisations appear to prioritise their stakeholders, with most 
frequent references to shareholders, customers and employees, followed by references to 
the society and at times the government (AA) and the suppliers (BA). Among their 
stakeholder (other than shareholders) groups, organisations frequently appear to refer to 
the need to maintain employee satisfaction.  
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Table 9 Summary of the ‘pattern-matching’ activity for ethics pragmatism 
Company  Before the accident After the accident 
BA 
 
Great emphasis on the importance of 
addressing stakeholder needs and 
environmental impacts to ensure viability; 
emphasis on questioning aviation’s 
contribution to climate change; particular 
emphasis on ensuring satisfied employees to 
add value; explicit reference to the 
importance of building a relationship of 
trust with stakeholders to reputation. 
 
 
Explicit acknowledgment of prioritising the 
needs of shareholders and customers over 
employees; continued great emphasis on the 
importance of addressing stakeholder needs 
for viability; continuing emphasis on the 
importance of stakeholders to reputation and 
corporate value; explicit acknowledgment 
of the increasing importance of integrity and 
ethics to consumers; acknowledgment that 
maintaining focus on CSRes is challenging 
during difficult market conditions. 
 
AF 
 
Focus on achieving minimal labour 
disruptions and attempts to present this as 
benefiting customers, investors and 
employees 
 
 
Frequent symbolic references to 
commitment to H&S following the accident; 
provision of accounts in detail on safety 
procedures; frequent attempts to change 
their AR’s headings to reflect an H&S 
focus; explicit reference of CSRes 
contributing to image; significant emphasis 
on sustainability as involving balancing 
environmental with social and economic 
needs; frequent reference to the importance 
of dialogue with unions; reference to 
sustainability as public expectations’ driven; 
references to ‘trade-offs’ between 
sustainability criteria. 
 
AA 
 
Frequent references to the importance of 
satisfying multiple stakeholders’ needs to 
ensure viability; emphasis on employee 
satisfaction to maintain quality of service 
and profitability. 
 
 
Great emphasis on the importance of 
employees in ensuring viability; frequent 
reference to the need to negotiate cost 
savings with employees and lenders to 
avoid bankruptcy; explicit 
acknowledgement of the critical role of a 
variety of stakeholders in surviving the 
crisis; focus on securing safe and 
convenient air travel.   
 
SIA 
 
Emphasis on the need for minimising staff 
costs to improve efficiency and deliver best 
service to customers 
  
 
Detailed reference to fleet renewal 
programs, with particular emphasis on 
safety; attempts to downgrade their role in 
the accident; reference to the potential 
negative impacts that the accident may have 
on image; detailed descriptions of their 
awards; great emphasis on the need for 
minimising staff costs by introducing 
permanent pay cuts to ensure viability. 
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(Table 9 continued) 
Company Before the accident After the accident 
SAS 
 
Significant emphasis on the links of 
environmental performance with business 
risks, partly from negative media coverage; 
acknowledgment of stringent regulation in 
the future as a business risk; explicit 
acknowledgement that CSR is becoming a 
financial imperative and to the importance 
of improving environmental image; 
emphasis on questioning aviation’s 
contribution to climate change. 
 
 
Very detailed (and frequently cited) 
explanation of how CSR is a growing 
expectation by various stakeholders, 
primarily customers and suppliers, and also 
an international trend; continuing emphasis 
on the positive contribution of CSR to 
image, particularly following Sep 11th; 
admission of its importance even on the 
competition of employees; reference to CSR 
as a means of regulation compliance; 
continued emphasis on questioning 
aviation’s contribution to climate change. 
 
 
 SAS, by conducting a risk-benefit analysis, identify further pragmatic reasons to 
engage with (and report on) CSRes, including criticism from the market and media, 
competition regarding soft values, customers and suppliers’ need, new environmental 
standards, and international trends. Another strand of pragmatic arguments, however, 
concerns attempts to manage public expectations, by questioning aviation’s contribution 
to climate change and emphasising its economic and social benefits. This is particularly 
evident in BA and AF. These arguments can be interpreted as attempts to anticipate, and 
prevent or forestall, potential challenges to legitimacy, usually occurring when companies 
operate in a ‘maintaining legitimacy’ mode. 
 Following the accidents and Sep 11th, all organisations make frequent references to 
their commitment to air-safety, which is said to be of ‘paramount importance’ (BA, 
2001SER, p.48) and where there are no budget restrains (AF, AA). However, following 
the accident, most organisations also acknowledge the link of social and environmental 
performance with image. Organisations express their concern over the consequences that 
the accident would have on their image (SIA, SAS) and some explicitly acknowledge that 
their environmental (SAS) and community (BA) programmes (including their CSR) serve 
as a means to improve that image. Organisations, therefore, appear to acknowledge being 
pragmatically motivated towards CSRes (and often also CSR) activities. Principal 
motivations include satisfying an array of stakeholders’ needs and particularly 
employees, but also customers, media and suppliers; competition on soft values; 
compliance to international trends and increasing regulation; and direct benefits to the 
image.  In addition to being pragmatically motivated, organisations at times appear to be 
opportunistically driven, as Table 10 reveals. Evidently, the organisational references are, 
once more, diverse as regards their content, although they do not appear to have been 
particularly affected by the accident. There appear to be three main types of opportunistic 
arguments: these involve influencing legislation, improving brand image and increasing 
shareholder value.  
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Table 10 Summary of the ‘pattern-matching’ activity for ethics opportunism 
Company Before the accident After the accident 
BA 
 
Frequent reference to the need to be 
proactive towards CSRes to add value to the 
products; continued attempts to present 
Terminal 5 as socially and environmentally 
beneficial; frequent reference to the need for 
environmental programmes to be 
economically reasonable and not distort 
competition; explicit attempt to pre-empt 
environmental taxation on aviation fuel 
 
 
Declaration that they will consider CSRes 
implications of decisions that promote 
shareholder value; acknowledgment that 
they would support some noise initiatives if 
they bring economic benefits; continuing 
emphasis on presenting Terminal 5 as 
essential to BA’s prosperity and UK’s 
wealth and job creation; continuing 
reference to the need for environmental 
programmes to be economically reasonable 
and not distort competition; continuing 
attempts to pre-empt environmental taxation 
on aviation fuel; explicit acknowledgment 
that community involvement programmes 
are means of reputation enhancement 
 
AF 
 
Explicit reference to measures taken to 
anticipate regulatory developments 
regarding noise standards 
 
 
Explicit reference to agreements signed with 
trade unions to anticipate future EC 
regulations re CSRes; some attempts to 
question the efficiency of fuel tax (as 
distorting competition); explicit references 
for CSRes as  having a positive impact on 
image and on share price 
 
AA 
 
Frequent reference to the dependence on 
employee satisfaction to increase 
shareholder value 
 
Continued frequent reference to the 
dependence on employee satisfaction to 
increase shareholder value 
 
SIA [no reference] [no reference] 
SAS 
 
Emphasis on the contribution of 
environmental work on image and market 
value; explicit reference that they can get a 
competitive advantage by anticipating legal 
or tax-related requirements and managing 
environmental impacts; explicit reference to 
environmental work as an added gain, to the 
primary aim of increasing competitiveness; 
explicit admission that environmental work 
provides opportunities for business 
development and reduces fuel and 
management costs 
 
 
Continued significant emphasis on the ‘win-
win’ view of environmental work; explicit 
link of environmental work to share price 
performance; significant emphasis on 
legislation avoidance as a means of 
competitive advantage; continuing emphasis 
on environmental work contributing to 
legislation avoidance; explicit reference that 
sustainability work enhances brand value 
 
 
A large proportion of the identified opportunistic arguments pertain to influencing 
regulation. These may involve anticipating future regulations in respect of CSRes (AF) 
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but also using CSR to influence the regulatory framework (SAS). Organisations also 
attempt to pre-empt environmental taxation on aviation fuel (BA, AF). And it is 
particularly BA, which seems to attempt pre-empting any governmental decision against 
the development of Heathrow’s Terminal 5 throughout the five year period, by reminding 
how important their contribution is on UK’s wealth, customers and employees. Notably, 
SAS also appear to link anticipating regulation with competitive advantage. A potential 
reason for this organisational focus on anticipating regulation is the high cost that 
organisations bear when new regulations (particularly with regard to noise) are put in 
place. On such occasions, organisations are called to withdraw and replace aircrafts from 
their fleet, which is particularly expensive in the capital-intensive aviation industry. And 
it appears to be, indeed, quite common for aviation companies to provide details (usually 
in tabular form) in their ARs of how the fleet complies with noise standards (SAS, BA, 
AF, AA). 
Organisations seem to be addressing their shareholders when they emphasise that 
their positive CSRes activities are an ‘added gain’, but their prime focus remains 
maintaining competitiveness (SAS, AF). Indeed, increasing shareholder value has been 
cited as a motivation for CSRes for most organisations (BA, AA, SAS), with AA and 
SAS explicitly noting that, ultimately, every business decision is taken with an interest in 
increasing shareholder wealth. It could also be argued that, considering that most often 
there references appear in the AR, this signifies that organisations may want to signal to 
their shareholders that CSRes activities, despite their potential costs, will ultimately 
benefit profitability.  
In conclusion, the review of the qualitative evidence reveals that, despite the 
differences in the way each organisation references these arguments, the motivations 
behind CSRes appear to be predominantly strategic, despite the proclaimed espousal of 
ethical principles by all organisations. These motivations primarily include from an ethics 
pragmatism perspective, satisfying stakeholders’ needs (including investors, employees, 
customers, media and suppliers), competition on soft values, compliance to international 
trends and increasing regulation, and direct benefits to the image; and from an ethics 
opportunist perspective, influencing legislation, improving brand image and increasing 
shareholder value. 
 
Summary of findings 
Table 11 consolidates the findings for both CSRes and CSR, by drawing on both the 
quantitative and qualitative analysis evidence. In respect of the qualitative analysis, to get 
some indication of the support for theoretical explanations incorporated in the study’s 
framework, each argument receives a ‘tick’ for being referenced as a motivation for 
CSRes and/or CSR at least once in each of the five reporting periods; this is regardless of 
the frequency of the reference within that period, therefore there is a maximum of five 
‘ticks’ for each theory. ‘Ticks’ in lower font size denote support for CSRes and in larger 
font size for CSR. Descriptions in bold denote support from the quantitative analysis (all 
in respect of CSR). The theoretical interpretations are grouped according to the variant of 
the framework they largely support and strategic arguments that can take both pragmatic 
and opportunistic interpretations are presented at the bottom of the table.  
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Table 11 Summary of the findings 
Theoretical arguments BA AF AA SIA SAS 
Business ethics theory √√ √ √√ √√√  
Accountability theory 
(holistic) √     
Stakeholder theory (moral) √ √ √√√ √  
Social environmental 
concerns / sustainability √√√√√ √√√ √√√ √√ √√√√√ 
St
ak
eh
ol
de
r c
ap
ita
lis
m
 
Transparency  √    
MAST     √ 
Public pressure  √√   √√ 
Institutional theory / trend     √√ 
Pressure from markets  / 
Competition √√√√ √    √√√ Eth
ic
s p
ra
gm
at
is
m
  
Stakeholder theory 
(strategic) √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√√√ √√√ 
Positive accounting theory      
Competitive advantage √√√√√    √√√√ 
Political Economy of Acc.      
Decision usefulness theory √√ √√√ √√  √√√√ 
Improving staff moral / 
satisfaction  √√√√ √√√   E
th
ic
s o
pp
or
tu
ni
sm
  
Influencing regulation √√√ √√√ √  √√√√√
Social contract theory √√  √√√√ √√√ √√√ 
Agency theory      
Accountability theory 
(strategic)      
Signalling theory      O
th
er
 st
ra
te
gi
c 
RRM √√√√√ √√√√ √√ √ √√√√√
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Thus, in respect of motivations for CSR, as Table 11 demonstrates there appears to 
be no support from either the quantitative or the qualitative analysis for the ethical 
arguments under the stakeholder capitalism variant. As discussed earlier, some arguments 
from the qualitative CA that could be considered as supporting ethical motivations for 
CSRes (and, in extension, possibly also for CSR) were originally identified (and are 
included in Table 11). These particularly pertained to proclaimed commitments to 
sustainability (but also transparency, and expressed ethical, social and environmental 
concerns). However, as the discussion revealed, these potentially supportive for the 
ethical variant arguments appeared to be strategically interpreted and were far from a 
reporting approach based on the interpretation of sustainability as in the Brundtland 
Report (UNWCED, 1987) and from acknowledging that all the company’s stakeholders 
have a right to information and CSR is “a key mechanism for social, environmental and 
economic sustainability” (Unerman, 2007, p. 89). Nevertheless, an inclusion of a 
normative variant in any framework attempting to explain CSR practice is necessary, if 
not in the hope that organisations may adopt such perceptions in the future, at least to 
acknowledge that some organisations may be (fully or at least partly) ethically driven. 
It could be argued that most of the remaining strategic theories find some empirical 
support by either qualitative CA (institutional theory/trend, pressure for 
markets/competition, competitive advantage, decision usefulness theory, influencing 
regulation) or quantitative CA (public pressure, stakeholder theory [strategic variant], 
social contract theory, accountability theory [strategic variant]), with RRM appearing to 
be the only one to be supported by both quantitative and qualitative analysis (qualitative 
analysis considers explicit references to image/reputation). The findings lend some 
support to both pragmatic and opportunistic image perceptions. These findings are 
consistent with arguments considering image as common in practitioner discourse 
(Unerman, 2008) as also reflected in the findings of the latest KPMG survey (2008), 
whereby 55% of their 2,200 surveyed corporations around the world (compared to 27% 
in 2005) considered improving brand and reputation as a prime motivation for CSR:  
 
This could indicate that companies are taking proactive steps to adjust to the social 
and economic challenges of our time. Brand and reputation are difficult to quantify 
or decipher, but these results seem to indicate that companies have determined that 
mishandling or avoiding their social and environmental responsibilities could be 
detrimental to their brand worth (p.19).  
 
The findings also lend some support to social contract theory and to a number of 
pragmatic arguments. As discussed above, the combination of the evidence from both the 
quantitative and qualitative analysis in this and the preceding chapter provides some 
support for the case that CSR can be explained on the basis of a ‘contractual’ relationship 
between organisations and society. Although organisations did not make a reference to 
public pressure pertaining to their CSR activities, these arguments are to a large extent 
overlapping with social contract theory and can thus be considered to have also been 
empirically supported by the findings. Qualitative analysis lent some support to both 
international trend and competition on the soft-values arguments. Particularly the 
argument that organisations engage with CSR to pick up on a trend can be considered to 
be supportive of institutional theory. 
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It could be argued that the strategic variants of stakeholder theory and 
accountability theory were also empirically supported. Although the organisations did not 
make any reference to accountability theory (and hence there is no direct support for it 
from the qualitative CA), its strategic variant may also be considered to be empirically 
supported by the findings, since both the quantitative and the qualitative evidence 
indicate that CSR is used to maximise the organisational economic prosperity. Both 
qualitative and quantitative CA evidence also provides some support for stakeholder 
theory, with regard to both CSR and CSRes. Although stakeholder theory can take both 
pragmatic and opportunistic interpretations, in Table 11 it is presented in the pragmatic 
group of theories because most often organisations refer to the criticality of addressing 
multiple stakeholder needs. 
In respect of the opportunistic arguments, the qualitative analysis lent some support 
to the competitive advantage, decision usefulness and influencing legislation 
interpretations. As the discussion in the preceding section indicated, a large proportion of 
the opportunistic arguments pertain to influencing regulation, most often in respect of 
CSRes but also of CSR. Most often the qualitative analysis evidence supported 
arguments for CSR as a means to increase shareholder value, as opposed to addressing 
shareholders’ information needs (although some arguments for the latter were also 
evident in SAS’ case). Particularly the qualitative analysis findings, therefore, extend 
Unerman’s (2008) argument over disclosures about corporate reputations: 
 
disclosures in the annual report about a corporation’s reputation (including its 
ranking in various reputation indices) may be aimed more at building economic 
reputation amongst investors than addressing the social and environmental 
expectations of a broad range of stakeholders (p. 363) 
 
and would suggest that CSR is ultimately employed and at times explicitly 
presented by organisations as a means to ensure their shareholders interests, by 
maintaining or expanding profitability. These arguments are consistent with Owen et al.’s 
(2005) findings that managers considered shareholders to be the most important group of 
stakeholders in CSR. The arguments are also consistent with the findings indicating that 
in the post-accident years organisations appeared to ‘shift’ information from the 
standalone reports to the ARs to focus on addressing their most important stakeholders 
concerns. It should be acknowledged, nevertheless, that since organisations’ overarching 
aim is profit maximisation, almost any activity undertaken by (particularly larger) 
organisations “must be, virtually by definition, in the interests of the organisation and its 
financial participants” (Spence and Gray, 2007, p. 17).  
As Table 11 also indicates, qualitative CA lent some support to a couple of 
arguments as motivations for CSRes but there was a lack of relevant supporting evidence 
for CSR. These include MAST and improving staff moral/satisfaction. In respect of 
increasing employee satisfaction, it could be argued that the references in the reports also 
contribute towards this aim and this could thus also be considered as motivation for CSR. 
Similarly, considering that the qualitative CA evidence provides some support for a 
MAST motivation for CSRes it could be argued that organisations would need to report 
on their CSRes to address the public concerns, as reflected or shaped by the media, and 
thus the support for MAST as motivation for CSRes could also be extended to CSR.   
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Finally, some arguments that could be considered as compatible with the identified 
LT variants were not supported by either the qualitative or the quantitative evidence, 
primarily because, by nature, they are difficult to be investigated. These include political 
economy of accounting, agency theory, signalling theory and positive accounting theory. 
With regard to political economy, to some extent all strategic arguments and relevant 
supporting evidence could be also considered as lending some support to this view. 
Positive accounting theory also entails that CSR is used in a strategic manner, and it has 
been argued that it is largely compatible with LT (Deegan, 2000), although its basic 
premise that managers would employ CSR to minimise reporting earnings, would appear 
to be in contrast to the findings of the study suggesting that CSR is employed to maintain 
or extend profitability. Signalling theory may also be considered as a lens to interpret the 
empirical evidence, although, to some extent all CSR activity could be considered by 
nature to be a ‘signal’ to target groups. Lastly, as regards agency theory, there was no 
evidence from the findings that managers and shareholders interests were in conflict – in 
contrast, as explained above, there was some supporting evidence that managers employ 
CSR as a means to maximise profitability and thus their interests coincide with those of 
the shareholders. Nevertheless, more research needs to be conducted to clarify how and 
to which extent these theories could serve as interpretations of CSR practice. 
 
Conclusion and implications 
This paper has considered the case of the aviation industry in corporate CSR 
reactions to legitimacy/image threats. The findings from all examined companies provide 
some support for all propositions of the study, although this support can only be tentative 
considering the nature of the collected evidence (particularly the, so far, lack of the 
comparative data) and the overall interpretive character of the study. The findings 
revealed that the organisations considerably increased their levels of total and H&S CSD 
(propositions 1 and 2) following the accident and are in agreement with the literature 
investigating reactions of specific companies to legitimacy threats. It was argued that the 
considerably higher increase in disclosure than the increases found by all other identified 
studies investigating legitimacy threats could be attributed to the aviation industry’s wide 
public visibility. It appears that following the threat, organisations increased their 
disclosure in the ARs to a greater extent than in the stand-alone reports, suggesting that 
they focused on ensuring they maintain communication with their most ‘critical’ 
stakeholders. Further, from the findings per theme of disclosure it could be inferred that 
organisations proportionately addressed a greater number of stakeholders, with H&S 
nevertheless being the theme with the highest proportional increase. When it was 
attempted to explain the differences in the absolute levels of disclosure, the country of 
origin appeared to be more suitable interpretive factor than the size.  
It was additionally empirically demonstrated that organisations considerably 
increased both positive and negative disclosure following the accident (propositions 3 
and 4). The increase in the negative disclosure was higher than the positive, in contrast to 
the majority of the literature. Although this could be partly interpreted as an 
organisational attempt to improve image by admitting guilt so as to create the impression 
of honesty, the interpretation that organisational attempts to reduce costs in the post-
accident (and September 11th) period instead resulted in a neglect and deterioration of 
their CSRes impacts, was found more convincing. Organisations also appear to have 
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increased both their substantive and symbolic total disclosure following the accident. The 
increase in substantive total disclosure was higher than the symbolic in most companies, 
and could be explained as organisational attempts to substantively address the threats’ 
(because of their possibly, in some cases, being compounded by September 11th) 
considerable magnitude. Both substantive and symbolic H&S disclosure also increased 
following the threat; however the increase in the symbolic disclosure was higher than the 
substantive in most cases, indicating that organisations, following the threat, were 
particularly interested in changing their constituents’ perceptions of their relevant impacts 
and improving their threatened image.  
The qualitative analysis findings generally indicate that organisations mostly 
adopted strategic, externally driven positions regarding their CSRes, despite their 
proclaimed espousal of ethical principles. The pragmatic motivations primarily include 
satisfying stakeholders’ needs (including shareholders, employees, customers, media and 
suppliers), competition on soft values, compliance with international trends and 
increasing regulation, and maintaining a positive image. Some strategic, internally driven 
arguments for CSRes, were also identified. The opportunistic motivations include 
influencing legislation, improving brand image and increasing shareholder value. In 
adopting more strategic approaches (particularly towards reporting their CSRes), the 
organisations seem to have been aided by the advice offered by the assurance providers 
of their stand-alone reports.  
The findings, thus, provide support for the adapted Bebbington et al. (2008a,b) 
arguments. Both the qualitative and the quantitative CA findings provide some support 
for both pragmatist and opportunist variants, whilst the support for the normative variant 
was limited. With regard to the pragmatic variant, the findings support arguments for 
public pressure, institutional and traditional LT. Regarding the opportunistic variant, the 
findings lent support to decision usefulness theory, competitive advantage and legislation 
avoidance theories.  
The possibility that some other explanations were behind the organisations CSR at 
the time, should nevertheless be acknowledged. It should also be acknowledged, that a 
number of limitations of identifying such broad variants became evident when 
conducting the analysis. It is at times difficult to determine whether some arguments and 
specific organisational actions are opportunistically or pragmatically motivated and e.g. 
references to influencing or anticipating legislation have been considered as opportunistic 
arguments, although to some extent they also relate to legislation compliance. Further, 
the stakeholder capitalism variant comprises a number of theoretical explanations, which, 
despite that they all appear to have a normative orientation, are quite diverse.  Although 
these limitations pertain to some extent to all research attempts to synthesise multiple 
theories, it is acknowledged that more research is needed to clarify the relationships of 
these theoretical arguments. 
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Appendix A. CA sampling and recording information 
 
Reviewed 
reports  
Whole page 
size 
(cells) 
Actual page 
size (cells) 
Average 
sentences per 
page 
Pages per 
Annual Report 
(a) (b) (c) (d)  
BA     
AR1999 25x35=875 21x30=630 28 72 
AR2000 25x35=875 22x29=638 40 64 
AR2001 25x35=875 22x28=616 43 64 
AR2002 25x35=875 21x30=630 42 64 
AR2003 25x35=875 21x30=630 44 68 
     
ER1999 25x35=875 18x27=486 27  
SE2000 22.5x32=720 18x30=540 27  
SE2001 29x36=1,044 24x30=720 30  
SE2002 25x35=875 21x31=651 47  
SE2003 25x35=875 21x28=588 30  
     
SUP1999 25x35=875 23x30=690 -  
SUP2000 25x35=875 23x30=690 -  
SUP2001 25x35=875 23x30=690 -  
SUP2002 25x35=875 23x30=690 -  
SUP2003 25x35=875 23x30=690 -  
     
AF     
Ref1999 4x10=40 3x10=30 27 136 
AR2000 4x10=40 4x7=28 22 43 
Ref2000 4x10=40 3x9=27 27 98 
AR2001 4x10=40 3x10=30 22 59 
Ref2001 4x10=40 4x8=32 25 112 
AR2002 4x10=40 3x7=21 17 70 
Ref2002 4x10=40 3x7=21 23 123 
AR2003 4x10=40 4x9=36 28 95 
Ref2003 4x10=40 3x9=27 29 129 
     
SIA      
AR1999 4x10=40 4x8=32 25 90 
AR2000 25x35=875 21x28=588 25 92 
AR2001 25x35=875 20x30=600 20 106 
AR2002 25x35=875 20x30=600 25 116 
AR2003 25x35=875 20x30=300 23 122 
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(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) 
SAS     
AR1999 25x35=875 18x28=504 37 116 
AR2000 25x35=875 18x28=504 40 109 
AR2001 25x35=875 18x28=504 40 119 
AR2002 25x35=875 20x29=580 46 122 
AR2003 25x35=875 20x30=600 50 118 
     
ER1999 25x35=875 18x28=504 35  
ER2000 25x35=875 18x28=504 35  
ER2001 27x20=540 18x28=504 35  
     
SUP2000 25x35=875 23x30=690 -  
     
AA     
AR1999 25x33=825 21x28=588 20 66 
AR2000 25.5x33=841.5 23x29=667 24 42 
AR2001 25.5x33=841.5 20x29=580 35 46 
AR2002 25.5x33=841.5 22x28=616 34 105 
AR2003 25.5x33=841.5 22x29=638 25 103 
     
ER2001 25.5x33=841.5 20x28=560 19  
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